10 Classic Ways to ‘Fix’ the Election Process
Greetings, [Redacted]
Thank you for inviting me to speak with you. From your message I understand that you are afraid that this year, voters may vote for the incorrect person, leaving your own august self unelected. I agree entirely that such an outcome could only occur if foul play were involved somehow, and you wish to anticipate that by setting in place some strategies of your own. This year, theories of election-rigging have abounded, so now is the perfect time to make theory into reality, using methods more effective than raising the dead.
Given the proliferation of comparisons to the ancient Greeks and Romans this election cycle, I believe we might usefully look to the ancients for guidance. Those from whom we draw our electoral systems were masters of controlling the vote and voters. The conventional methods of false promises, flattery, pandering to special interests, and opponent-smearing are all recounted in an ancient guide such as Quintus Cicero’s handbook. (Q. Cic. Pet. 1) But sometimes the conventional is insufficient.
I therefore present to you several historical examples that might be of use to you in taking measures to ‘correct’ the vote:
Option 1) Divert the voters from the polls!
To vote in Rome, one had to be present, a fact that benefitted those who lived in Rome and the wealthy, who could afford to take the time to travel to Rome. But in the early days of the Republic, this law had another potential consequence. By calling for a draft of the men and marching them out of the city, the Senate managed to shape the population still in the city enough to force through some desired votes.
In other words, the Roman Senate could call men up for war on specious reasoning to prevent them from voting. Indeed, in this way, they managed to put off the people’s disfavor (briefly) in 494 BCE and keep reforms at bay from 462 to 459. (See, for example, Livy 2.32.1 and 3.24.1.)
It is possible that calling up the National Guard or another group on Election Day might have a similar effect today. It is only fair to warn you, however, that this led to armed mutiny in 494, in the famous Secession of the Plebs.
It may also be the case that this is not the group you desire to exclude, so I have a second, similar solution for you:
Option 2) Institute emergency measures!
The Roman senators knew that it was entirely possible for the people to elect someone untenable. There was another recourse, however. The Senate could issue a decree enjoining the current consuls (if they lived) to appoint a dictator, whose authority was greater than that of the consuls. This measure was normally taken for military emergencies, but could be used for a wide variety of reasons, down to and including clavi figendi cause (which literally means “for the sake of driving a nail,” referring to a religious ritual).
In 298 BCE, the Senate was considering appointing a dictator to obviate the election results. The prospect of the wrong candidate becoming consul was considered to be enough of an emergency. In the end, however, no drastic measures were needed, because the people elected M. Valerius, the very man the Senate had intended to appoint as dictator (Livy 10.11.4).
Similar cases may appear elsewhere in 4th century elections — modern commentators of Livy, such as S. P. Oakley, have noted that several of the dictatorships in the fourth century seem to have rather specious rationales. That might well reflect similar “emergencies.” (Like the current “emergency” causing the Republicans to obstruct a Supreme Court candidate…)
Option 3) Revoke your Opponents’ Citizenship
In 468 BCE, the Syracusans decided to revoke the citizenship of the men who had been granted citizenship years earlier by the tyrant Gelon for fighting against the Carthaginian invasion. Ostensibly, the reason for the revocation was that these men were untrustworthy, but Diodorus Siculus also suggests that there was a plan to exclude them from running for election. And predictably, these veterans seized the fortifications of Syracuse, starting another civil war.
But perhaps this is an impractical mode of attack. In that case, I advise you to go after your opponents’ supporters instead of your opponent and…
Option 4) Redefine the state!
For a second Greek example, consider the Athenian “coup of 411 BCE” (Thucydides 8.63ff). Politics in fifth-century Athens frequently pitted the landed aristocrats against the poorer farmers and tradesmen. As soldiers were required to purchase their own gear, the Athenian army was dominated by the wealthier classes while the navy was dominated by the poorer classes.
In 411, the majority of the Athenian navy was abroad in the eastern Aegean off Chios. Given this opportunity, the remaining members of the assembly voted it out of existence, putting power in the hands of the Four Hundred, who took advice only from the elite (defined roughly as the five thousand wealthiest citizens, selected by the Four Hundred).
A similar overthrow happened with the Syracusans in 410 BCE (see Xenophon, Hellenica 1.27). In that case, it was the absence of the oligarchic generals that allowed the popular expulsion of the oligarchy.
But perhaps you do not desire to actually disenfranchise any group in the long term. In that case, it might be best to resort to…
Option 5) Bribery!
A common ancient technique of swaying the vote was to engage in outright bribery. While it seems to have been most commonly used for gaining special appointments or swaying juries of magistrates, bribery was also sometimes employed in elections. The Athenians were more concerned about voters being bribed by foreigners than by local politicians. They tolerated this sort of ‘non-treasonous bribery’ (see Hypereides 1.24–25).
By contrast, there are too many examples of election-related bribery in the Roman Late Republic to list. The African king Jugurtha was said to have quipped, “there is an entire country for sale, if it can find a buyer.” Even the stalwart moral exemplar of Cato the Younger was inclined to turn a blind eye to bribery, so long as it was used to keep the wrong people from power (Suetonius, Iul. 19.1). The result was successfully bringing Bibulus to power as consul (in 59 CE) to counter the power of Julius Caesar.
Bribery was, of course, illegal at Rome, but there was nevertheless so much collusion and bribery in the courts and assemblies alike that convictions were rare (and were likely motivated by partisan politics more than actual wrongdoing). If you want know more, Clare Taylor has an interesting 2 part article in Greece and Rome (part1) (part2).
If you find bribery distasteful (or, in spite of your protestations otherwise, you do not have enough money to bribe people effectively) and you consider your opponent to be more photogenic than you, there is another, albeit unorthodox solution…
Option 6) Ban nice clothes (and laundry detergent)!
This one has the benefit of not even being illegal by modern US law! Livy (4.25) reports that in 432 BCE, the Romans banned political candidates from bleaching their clothes white so that they stood out when walking around the city. In theory, this measure was meant to level the playing field between those who could afford nicer clothes and those who could not, hindering the patrician class from sweeping the vote. This tactic removes the edge that a better-dressed, more stylish candidate could otherwise have.
But let us say that our corrective measures fail to work. Consider…
Option 7) A Little Judicious Application of Violence!
It was not unusual for Roman politics to boil over into riots. The politician Gaius Memmius was murdered by his rival’s supporters at the election itself in 100 BCE. (Appian’s account here is disputed.) In 91, the consul Lucius Philippus was driven, bleeding, from an assembly by the tribune Drusus and his supporters (Val. Max. 9.5.2). The lex Licinia of 66 BCE ostensibly hindered the ability of politicians to pack the crowds with armed supporters, but seems to have been minimally effective.
This year’s election cycle has already been awash with accusations of inciting supporters to violence. This is a time when modern society may be ripe for a little discreet thuggery.
But if you think that voter intimidation is insufficient, we may move to another time-honored tradition:
Option 8) Slay your opponent in mortal combat!
This option is nowhere near as rare in our ancient models as we might expect. The most famous example is probably the murders of Tiberius Gracchus in 133 BCE and those of Fulvius Flaccus and Gaius Gracchus in 121. After defeating his opponent Catiline for the consular election for 63, the famous orator Cicero declared Catiline was intending to take the consulship by force and effectively declared war on Catiline, who was killed in the ensuing battles. In 53 BCE, Marc Antony, sword in hand, chased Clodius through the streets of Rome. Clodius survived through hiding in a bookstore. (Cic. Phil. 2.9.21)
Of course you would not have to do the murder yourself. You could try to subtly goad gun owners into doing it for you. The Romans even had a peculiar custom …
Option 9) Reinstitute Proscription!
The Romans of the Late Republic had an unusual custom for getting rid of political opponents. Those in charge could publish “proscription lists,” and killing anybody whose name appeared on such a list was more or less legal. Those on the lists frequently fled into the provinces. Their property in Italy, meanwhile, was confiscated — so proscription both drove one’s political enemies out of the immediate competition and provided income to support one’s own campaign. This tactic was used most famously by Sulla in 82 BCE (and following years) and by the ‘Second Triumvirate’ in 43 (and following years).
But it might be better to choose a less drastic method of removing one’s opponents, and so I propose my last ancient solution…
Option 10) The proper application of manure!
Julius Caesar and a certain M. Calpurnius Bibulus (mentioned above) were co-consuls in 59 BCE. Bibulus declared an intent to vow every day that Caesar tried to pass a law to be a religious holiday (by Roman custom, legislation could not occur on a religious holiday). But why was Bibulus famously ineffective? Caesar’s supporters emptied chamber pots upon Bibulus and attacked him when he left the house, rendering Bibulus incapable of addressing the crowds or vetoing Caesar’s legislation (Plut. Cato 32.2).
Why sling figurative mud when superior substances are available?
Aaron L. Beek is a scholar of ancient history, piracy, and Roman drama. He holds a Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota (2015) and has since worked at Nova Classical Academy (St. Paul, MN) and Massey University (Palmerston North, New Zealand).
